Real Madrid's Latest Nightmare: the making of an offensive collapse / News - Basketnews.com
Credit BasketNews/Begum Unal Real Madrid is not a club you come across with negative records or connotations. They are simply not.
3-pointers this season
34%9,0Points made:9,0Accuracy:34,1%Place in standings:7Record max:14Record min:1Most made 3FGs:Rudy FernandezTeamEuroLeagueStatisticsScheduleBut last Thursday, their latest offensive woes culminated in an embarrassing 47-68 loss against Zalgiris Kaunas, the last ranked team in EuroLeague.
Credit to Zalgiris, who were clearly doing many things better to get their second win in succession but you cannot see Real Madrid scoring less than 50 points on any given day. It happened only once in their entire Euroleague history. And it happened that night.
Many astonishing facts will strike you along the way if you go deeper into the numbers.
For example, 6 of their abysmal 47 points were made of put-backs by Walter Tavares. They drew 18 fouls, but only went to the free-throw line 6 times, hitting four of them.
No player except Vincent Poirierand Tavaresmade more than 3 FGs. Nigel Williams-Goss andGuerschon Yabuselefinished the game with 1/18 from the field, andSergio Llullwas 3/15.
As Real Madrid were 1/15 behind the arc, the number of missed 3-pointers was enough to build a brick house. But you want to hear something more gloomy than that? They are 9/67 (13%) in their last 3 games in the competition.
These numbers are totally cursed.
However, Rome was not built in one day and the same goes for Los Blancos’ offensive collapse. Last night was not an exception. They had a history of making this night happen.
The Making: A Short Sketch
Real Madrid have been among the best offensive units in their recent history it comes to offensive efficiency.
We don’t have the exact figures for the years going back to the 2010s but since the season of 2015-2016 and until last season, we are sure by quantitative proof: Pablo Laso's men have always been the best among the Top 5, in points per possession. That was the key on the way for all those Final Fours and 2 Euroleague titles.
Trey Thompkins
MIN:12.58PTS:6.22 (43.64%)REB:2.33As:0.56ST:0.44BL:0.11TO:0.67GM:9ProfileEuroLeague2021/2022Starting with last season, things appear to be changing.
They barely missed yet another Final Four last season, after falling in the decider game in the playoffs against Anadolu Efes thanks to a Krunoslav Simon's clutch 3-pointer. Yes, they had an unlucky season with various injury troubles and unexpected roster changes.
But one thing was clear: their offense was far from the previous years’ prowess. With 0.96 points per possession, they came in only 9th position.
The current season could be deemed for a continuation of that negative trend, as they slumped to 94 points (in 100 possessions) in EuroLeague, a mediocre 10th place.
Sure, one does not need to appeal the advanced stats to observe the struggle as they succumbed below 70 points 6 times already in this season. Losing against Barcelona, Fenerbahce, UNICS,Olympiacos, and finally, Zalgiris in the process.
Some sequences from these previous collapses flash in our recent memory. Despite leading 25-10 against Barcelona through mid 2nd quarter in the Copa Del Rey final, Real managed to score only 24 more points in the remaining two and a half quarters.
In Istanbul, Fenerbahce Beko limited them to 17 points in the first halfwhere the Spanish giants could not score for 8 minutes sharp, almost a quarter.
Earlier in the season, their set offense stalled against Olympiacos as they could score only 12 non-transition points in the second half.
Likewise, against UNICS, they could only make 24 points in the second half, remained 1/14 behind the arc.
The list goes on and on. Something is terribly wrong here.
The Personnel: Injuries and the reshuffle
Certainly, one immediately thinks about the most obvious reasons: the aging of the main players, the fatigue, the injuries… It is not hard to see that time is taking its toll on this roster.
Trey Thompkins, who had knee surgery in the summer could only return in January and it is unfair to expect him to get back to his usual level immediately.
Similarly, Anthony Randolph missed almost the entire season of 2020-2021 and he is hardly the player that we used to watch before all this.
The old boy Jaycee Carroll, who was usually the unsung hero of all those glorious Final Four seasons, is still out of sight since picking up injuries at the beginning of the season.
Besides, the roster reshuffles with signings and departures did not help with the team chemistry.
Gabriel Deck, who left just before the playoff series last season, came back while last year’s good revelation, Usman Garuba got his taste of the NBA.
Vincent Poirier was never the same player in his comeback to Spain after his brief NBA tenure, both physically and mentally.
The administrative office might be questioning the decision for letting Nicolas Laprovittola go to Barcelona, as none of the refurbished backcourt members among Nigel Williams-Goss, Thomas Heurtel, and Adam Hanga, could establish themselves as the undisputed ball-handler at point guard.
No one can blame Rudy Fernandez for not being able to save the days with his weird-looking long-range 3-pointers at the age of 36.
But among all, perhaps Sergio Llull’s situation needs special attention.
After missing so many games because of injuries in successive years, 34-year-old two-time EuroLeague champion Llull finally regained his health for this season, but obviously, he is far from his best days.
Like the rest of the team, Llull’s biggest issue is his 3 point shooting.
As the second pick and roll ball handler of the team after Thomas Heurtel (they initiated more than half of all pick and rolls so far together), the 2017 MVP of EuroLeague has always been a high-volume 3-point shooter.
But despite hitting with 28%, the lowest percentage of his entire career, he is still the highest 3-point shot taker per game with 5.1 (his highest since 2018-19), then we could say that there is mismanagement in the offensive setup.
Llull might be overshooting behind the arc, because of his diminishing tendency to make layups. As a 34-year old player, there is nothing more normal than the legs getting slower and it is more laborious for him to utilize his usual quickness the get a clean look near to the rim, in the traffic.
Maybe, for this reason, he peaked his volume of jumpers, instead of taking closer shots at the rim, like layups or floaters. But that tactical shift just backfired.
In 80% of his pick and roll plays as a ball-handler, Llull took a jump shot but scored only 0.66 points per possession, which is never a sufficient rate.
Llull Shot Making after Pick and Rolls
Llull Share of Jumpers among all shots (%)
Points per Possession as Pick and Roll Ball Handler
2021-22
80%
0.64
2020-21
59%
0.73
2019-20
61%
0.64
2018-19
74%
0.87
The System: Off-Screen Shots and Weak-Side Offenses
Despite the lack of individual form, not all the blame can be put on one or a few players.
Besides, Pablo Laso’s game-winning skills are usually independent of the names available in his hand. He has repeatedly pulled a new item off his hat, even in the most adverse situations.
It was Fabien Causeur, who lifted Real Madrid in the Final Four in Belgrade 2018, despite not playing so efficiently during the entire year.
During last season’s playoffs, Usman Garuba, who played a career-best 24 points 12 rebounds in the 4th game almost stole Efes’ ticket to Final Four.
Last year’s memories also involve Tristan Vukcevic’s unexpectedly good effort and the dagger in El Clasico.
We even saw a Real Madrid team that had youngsters like Urban Klavzar, Sediq Garuba, Baba Miller and Vukcevicshockingly win against CSKA 71:65. Players can change but Laso’s solid structures and routines could become sufficient to win that kind of game.
Off-Screen: If we would like to summarize one big highlight aspect of Real Madrid's offense, it is their unorthodoxy. In the age of pick and roll, Laso’s offensive system is based on an alternative way when it comes to shot creation.
Standing as a big contrast with last season’s title holders Anadolu Efes, Real Madrid are among the very top teams who use the off-ball screens the most as an offensive routine.
Those off-ball screens usually come in the form of a flare or stagger screen, which have been the signature actions of Laso’s offensive scheme. Everyone who watches EuroLeague routinely will quickly recognize this setting.
Usually, Jaycee Carroll is probably one of the best weapons to use to build this kind of an offensive routine where nearly 1/3 of all off-screen offenses were played on him. He rarely disappointed with production (His point per possession of this specific type of offense were 2,35- 1,06- 1,06 and 1,23 in successive years).
He was not the only one obviously, as Rudy Fernandez became a solid secondary option despite the diminishing athletic capacity to be a catch and shoot player as well.
These types of off-screen sets used to look like this when they utilize them perfectly.
The Third Man: On a more abstract level, they create the shots with some clear-cut spacing principles. Not only do they play with 4 small-1 big combinations, but also, stack those 4 players into a single side to create a weak side for catch and shoot or catch and drive actions.
This shift to 4-to-1 spacing is usually processed by utilizing the 'third man option' in the pick and rolls. Once the weak side is created, the third man sneaks around as a shooter while the guard and the big man are drawing interest from the defense.
Here are simple examples of weak side creating via post-up play where Jeffrey Taylor becomes the weak side shooter and Adam Hanga, who extra passes to Fabien Causeur, becoming the third man of an Heurtel-Tavares pick and roll.
The third man option used to be a very effective weapon for Real Madrid.
From 2017 to 2020, the usage of third man option remained high and the shot quality remained fairly good as well (if he excludes the year where Euroleague season was canceled) Throughout the years, that frequency diminished to 11%, and their 3 pointer accuracy fell to 38% from very high plus 40% figures.
Here are some more examples of this type, ended up with triples from Thompkins and Randolph.
Certainly, things were much easier to play in this way when Facundo “El Mago” Campazzo, fully healthy Trey Thompkins, Anthony Randolph, and Jaycee Carroll, much younger Rudy Fernandez and Sergio Llull, and catch and shoot specialist Klemen Prepelic was playing there.
Season
Pick and Roll (Third man Option)
2 FG% (third man option)
3 FG% (third man option)
17-18
155/579 (27%)
16/28(57%)
56/123 (46%)
18-19
243/746 (33%)
21/38(55%)
97/199 (49%)
19-20
204/613 (33%)
9/29(31%)
67/172 (39%)
20-21
109/754 (14%)
4/12(33%)
47/95(49%)
21-22
59/521 (11%)
5/6(83%)
20/52 (38%)
Big 3-point volume: It is not always necessary, but the offensive predisposition with a big share for off-screens, the third man option, and the weak side attacks usually create a huge amount of three-pointers.
Real Madrid has always been among the Top 3 the highest volume-high accuracy 3 points shooting team in Euroleague since last 5-6 years.
In 2018-19, their volume of attempts behind the arc peaked at nearly half of all shots.
Season
Off-Screen Shot Frequency in All Shots (Ranking in EL)
Off-Screen Shot Accuracy
3 point Accuracy
17-18
13.2% (1st)
48% (4th)
38% (8th)
18-19
13%(1st)
46% (5th)
38% (7th)
19-20
15% (1st)
51% (4th)
38%(6th)
20-21
11% (2nd)
42% (13th)
36% (13th)
21-22
9% (3rd)
45% (5th)
34% (12th)
The Drawback: Certainly, that overwhelming success in the 3-point zone also opens up the space as the defenses have to stretch out to protect themselves from outside threats. That would mean more space for going downhill after pick and rolls and using Walter Tavares or Vicent Poirier near to the rim as a threat from yet another strand.
But there is a catch: As modern it is, being overly dependent on the 3-point shooting is carrying some risk with it. The success of this scheme has a lot to do with the quality of the shots and the quality of the screens. You need the right person, the right chemistry and eventually, the clutch players can actually make that shot.
Besides, for a team like Real Madrid that runs the offense, not through pick and rolls and off-screens, roster instability and player form became a larger factor, when compared to pick and roll masters like Anadolu Efes.
As mentioned before, they are sorely missing Trey Thompson and Anthony Randolph’s weak side threat or as a corner shooter, deployed as a pick and roll third man option, on many occasions.
The lifts come with the off-screen catch and shooters like Jaycee Carroll and Rudy Fernandez are no longer there.
But also, incompatibility with the required personnel vis-a-vis established offensive order in Pablo Laso’s systematics might be one of the reasons for this season’s decline in the offense.
For example, Thomas Heurtel is a microwave scorer and a strong pick and roll ball handler with a natural propensity to take mid-range jumpers.
This season, out of 179 picks and roll plays he got involved, he took a shot on 100 of them. Other 40 of them, passed the ball to the rolling player.
Since 2017-2018, only 1/5 of the pick and rolls he initiated ended up with the third man. In other words, his game does not lead up to using that option that often.
Likewise, finding the 3rd man ratio for Williams-Goss was only 16% this season. He is usually a type of guard who intends to go for a short-mid two-pointer or floater, if possible out of the pick and rolls.
The same ratio for the third man was 26% for Sergio Llull in the last 4 seasons, and during his 2017-2020 tenure in Real Madrid, it was almost 40% for Facundo Campazzo.
Real Madrid not only was cut down from their catch and shoot channels with ineffective off-screen plays but also, their pick and roll play lost one dimension.
The Collapse In Action: Examples from Games
If you managed to survive until this part data-driven filled with facts and figures, some good news is coming: now the fun part begins.
Given all these facts, we need to exemplify how exactly the offensive problems occurred with some video content. For each case, we put only two or three videos to be concise.
The first signals came in the game against Olympiacos, in the early parts of the season. After reaching the final quarter with 54-52 behind, Real Madrid could score only 7 points during the crucial 7 minutes of the 4th quarter.
During the process, Olympiacos extended the lead to 11, which eventually proved decisive to win the game. Nigel William-Goss was assigned for point guard duties at that part and perhaps it was giving an early warning whether he was the right type of player that would run Real Madrid’s off-screen heavy system.
In the first example, we saw what we used to see from Pablo Laso’s shot creation methods. Heurtel comes out of stagger screens only to create a high pick and roll with Tavares. Eventually, Yabusele gets the ball in the low post where Causer is available on the weak side. Yabusele can never find him and instead, takes a shot from a tough angle.
In the second example, they created the weak side again but the third man does not find any kind of an open shot.
Nigel Williams-Goss drives to the perimeter to what he loves the best: send a floater out of a pick and roll. But the perimeter was closed so he kicks out to Llull for a very, very stagnated offense in a very crucial part of the game.
In the third one, Abalde comes off-stagger screen and Jeffrey Taylor makes a slash-cut to create weak aside offense for Rudy Fernandez.
But neither Abalde is a player that can take a catch&shoot from there nor Rudy is the same player as he was a few years ago to make something good out of it regularly. The offensive phase ends up with a terrible turnover.
The 58:65 defeat against UNICS came in a double game week, so it was understandable of some sort.
Pablo Laso decided to take advantage of UNICS switching defense so instead of going for the regular off-screen setups, he went for post-up offenses, using Tavares- Lorenzo Brown or even Marco Spissu mismatches around the rim, a tactic that kept Real Madrid in the game until the 4th quarter.
But eventually, post-ups were stalled without the outside threat, and the offense looked decimated without the creation via off-screens. In the last quarter, they tried to run their signature moves when UNICS, only to fail and succumb scoring only 3 points in the last 6:45 remaining. They kept hitting the wall.
The first example shows how it was supposed to work, actually. Adam Hanga opens the space by a ghost screen and Poirier rolls to the rim. Yabusele pops up as the Third Man in the setup to send a successful three.
The second example is one of the signature sets of Pablo Laso’s Real Madrid. It starts with hand-offs to bring Jeffrey Taylor at the top and prepare off-cuts from both sides. However, the mix-up of the screen setup was working very poorly for some reason and Llull cannot get out very explosively. No good shot could be created.
Against Fenerbahce, he DID run for those off-screen attempts. But once again, they simply did not have the personnel at the required level.
Two of their top off-screen offense producers were almost non-existent. Thomas Heurtel was not available, Fabien Causeur was largely ineffective for some reason and Guerschon Yabusele had a non-covid related illness and probably should not have played, as Pablo Laso admitted it.
In their absence, it was Rudy Fernandez, who took all the weight as an off-screen cutter. Out of 70 Madrid possessions in total, he took 6 of 14 offenses of this type.
But Fenerbahce is an expert team on limiting their opponents behind 3 point arc as they let only 32%, among the very best in the competition. Despite the aggressive close-outs with the likes of Dyshawn Pierre and Jehvye Floyd, Real Madrid insisted on sending from deep with 30 attempts, hitting only 6 of them. Rudy was left with 2/9.
The three examples show the failure of the off-screen catch and shoot three-pointers from Rudy and Llull.
Against Zalgiris, Laso’s move was interesting. Being well-aware of the poor outside shooting form of his team, he opted to play post-ups, created BY those off-cutters, and use weak-side options.
In the first example, Jeffrey Taylor uses an off-screen to create a post-up spacing for Walter Tavares, who gets the ball and immediately recognizes Gabriel Deck on the weak side. But Deck is not the right player to take a catch and shoot from there. That's not his expertise. So instead, he catches and drives but not quickly enough. So Zalgiris's defense brings help.
In the second example, this time it was Abalde who uses screens to get a position in the wing, with the intention to find Tavares in the mismatch. Real Madrid convinced Zalgiris that the outside threat was off so that they could concentrate on protecting the rim.
But this team is just not accustomed to this kind of play. They tried it with 6 different players (Yabusele, the most with 3 times) without any success.
Out of 10 possessions, they made only 1 point out of it.
Against Barcelona in their latest Euroleague matchup, they did not even try to initiate off-screen offenses. Instead, they usually hinged on pick and rolls initiated by Sergio Llull.
But of 20 plays of this type, Llull used the ball 8 times and failed to attack the rim against the no-switching and drop-in scheme of Jasikevicius’ Barcelona.
The result? He finished the game with 1/10 field goals and 0/6 threes. I really wonder what would happen if Tavares did not go to season-high with 25 points, scoring almost in every occasion, even with those long-mid ranges.
The Copa Del Rey final was even worse as they played half of their pick and rolls on Sergio Llull, with only one layup being made. There were a lot of isolations as well (12% of their offenses to be exact, which is not Laso's style at all.
Conclusion
Every team can have stalls and problems on both ends of the court that leads up to historical lows. Even if they are the team called Real Madrid.
After winning games in all competitions, they lost 5 of their last 8.
But let's not forget that this team did not lose for three months any team other than Barcelona (from the end of October to the end of January). They are also still in the top 2 of Euroleague and top of the ACB.
Actually, it might be even better for them to have those problems during the regular season, in order to give some food for thought for the decisive playoff matchups. But some adjustments and calibrations are needs to be made.
So why Real Madrid is failing in the offense?
Because they are getting away from the offensive scheme that made them one of the most impeccable offensive units in the Euroleague: The off-screen shot creation and the weak-side third man option in the pick and rolls.
There are three main reasons for this: The injuries that brought the spine of this playing scheme; Trey Thompkins, Anthony Randolph, Jaycee Carroll.
The lack of form of Rudy Fernandez and Sergio Llull due to aging, injuries, and fatigue.
The roster reshuffle put the backcourt rotation in an unstable state; Laprovittola leaving, Heurtel, Goss-Williams, and Hanga joining in while Deck made a yoyo move back and forth between NBA and EuroLeague.
Besides, the incompatibility of the incoming guard line with the preceding offensive scheme of Pablo Laso, compared to the previous seasons might have played a big role.
Certainly, COVID-19 related cases and last-minute postponements broke the rhyme and roster stability.
Is the situation remediable? Of course. Well, when things get out of control, Pablo Laso has always come up with a makeshift solution to put things on the right track again. When Thompkins and Randolph's strength and game practice gets enhanced, that would ameliorate many problems on its own.
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